Much attention has been given recently to the mechanism of bring of logics, allowing free mixing of the connectives and using proof rules from both logics. Fibring seems to be a rather useful and general form of combination of logics that deserves detailed study. It is now well understood at the proof-theoretic level. However, the semantics of bring is still insu ciently understood. Herein we provide a categorial de nition of both proof-theoretic and model-theoretic bring for logics without terms. To this end, we introduce the categories of Hilbert calculi, interpretation systems and logic system presentations. By choosing appropriate notions of morphism it is possible to obtain pure bring as a coproduct. Fibring with shared symbols is then easily obtained by cocartesian lifting from the category of signatures. Soundness is shown to be preserved by these constructions. We illustrate the constructions within propositional modal logic.
Introduction
The problem of combining logics has attracted attention from both a theoretical point of view and a practical point of view. For a balanced presentation of the main theoretical motivations and issues see 5] . The mechanism of bring two logics by allowing the free mixing of the symbols from both logics and the reasoning by applying inference rules from both logics is well understood 8]. Fibred semantics is another matter: as described in 9], it has an operational avour and it is not clear at all the structure of the resulting models. We present a novel semantics of bring with explicit models that follows the intuitions on bred semantics. To this end, the notion of interpretation system that we propose seems to have the right level of abstraction. However, in this paper we concentrate only on propositional-based logics, i.e., logics without terms and variable binding operators like quanti cation. The proposed approach seems to be workable in the more general case, but its complexity and the usefulness of propositional-based logics well justify presenting only the results on the simpler case.
We also present bring at both proof-theoretic and model-theoretic levels and in two forms (unconstrained and constrained by sharing symbols) as categorial constructions, using coproducts and cocartesian liftings. Note that we allow the sharing of any symbols of the same arity, including logical connectives and modalities.
The use of the categorial machinery may discourage some readers but it is well justi ed. Indeed, we were very much helped by the categorial imperatives when ne tuning the abstraction for characterizing the semantics of bring. Furthermore, the preservation results are clear corollaries of general properties of the morphisms. The usefulness of the categorial techniques in the area of the combination of logics has already been recognized in 12, 17, 18] . The notion of institution 10] is another important source for those interested in the use of categories in logic.
The category theoretic concepts we use can be found in the rst few chapters of any textbook on category theory. We suggest 1], and specially 3] as far as (co)cartesian liftings are concerned. When establishing the category of interpretation systems we face some foundational issues that we do not discuss herein. The interested reader is referred to MacLane's standpoint on the matter 15]. For other approaches see 6] .
In section 2, after establishing the appropriate category of Hilbert calculi, we show that unconstrained bring appears as a coproduct. And we show that constrained bring (by sharing symbols) appears as a cocartesian lifting from the category of signatures.
In section 3, we repeat the process for interpretation systems. Fibring at the semantic level is much more di cult to characterize but again we obtain it as a coproduct (in the unconstrained case) and as a cocartesian lifting (in the constrained case).
In section 4, we put together inference rules and models in the notion of logic system presentation. It is then straightforward to capitalize on the results of the two previous sections in order to characterize bring with proofs and semantics hand in hand. In this section we consider several examples of logic system presentations and illustrate bring within modal logic. We also address the problem of bring intuitionistic and classical logics.
In section 5, after some preliminary results showing how derivation and entailment are transferred from the given logics into the resulting logic, we show that soundness is preserved.
We conclude the paper with some remarks on how to extend the results to logics with terms and variable binding operators, the open problem of proving the preservation by bring of model existence and completeness, and the development of a generalized notion of interpretation system capable of representing general frames 20] . We also brie y discuss possible applications of the proposed techniques in software engineering and arti cial intelligence. 2 
Fibring of Hilbert calculi
In this section we present a proof-theoretic account of bring as a categorial construction. We start by establishing the notion of signature that we need. Then, we introduce Hilbert calculi distinguishing between proof rules and derivation rules. This notion is rather general in the sense that it covers many kinds of calculi as long as they do not include terms and variable binding operators like quanti cation and abstraction.
After establishing the appropriate category of Hilbert calculi, we show that unconstrained bring appears as a coproduct. And we show that constrained bring (by sharing symbols) appears as a cocartesian lifting from the category of signatures.
Along the way, we compare our de nitions with the intuitive notion of bring as described for instance in 8, 9].
Signatures
At the syntactic level, the basic idea of bring relies on the assumption that formulae in each logic are inductively built up from a certain set of atoms using constructors. In our notion of signature, we take atoms as nullary constructors. Therefore, we make no formal distinction between say propositional symbols and logical connectives. In particular coproducts and pushouts exist in Sig. Both kinds of colimits will be used in the sequel. Coproducts allow us to put together two signatures without any sharing of constructors. Pushouts will be used for putting constructors together. We review here the coproduct, the special case of the pushout construction that we need, and the coequalizer (of course, all up to isomorphism).
The coproduct of two signatures C 0 and C 00 is the signature C 0 C 00 endowed with injections i 0 : C 0 ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 : C 00 ! C 0 C 00 such that, for each k 2 IN: { (C 0 C 00 ) k is the disjoint union of C 0 k and C 00 k ; { i 0 k and i 00 k are the injections of C 0 k and C 00 k into (C 0 C 00 ) k , respectively.
The pushout of two injective signature morphisms with the same source f 0 : C ! C 0 and f 00 : C ! C 00 is the signature C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 endowed with the morphisms g 0 : C 0 ! C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 and g 00 : C 00 ! C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 such that, for each k 2 IN: The coequalizer of two signature morphisms with same source and target f; g : C ! C 0 is the signature C 0 = f;g endowed with the morphism q : C 0 ! C 0 = f;g such that, for each k 2 IN: { (C 0 = f;g ) k is the quotient set C 0 k = f;g k , with f;g k the smallest equivalence relation on C 0 k containing fhf k (c); g k (c)i : c 2 C k g; { q k (c 0 ) is the f;g k equivalence class of c 0 2 C 0 k .
Note that pushouts exist even if we do not assume that f 0 and f 00 are injective, but for the purposes of sharing we only use injective maps. Moreover, general pushouts are harder to present. Note also that every coequalizer is a family of surjective maps.
We shall use, later on, the fact that the pushout of two morphisms f 0 : C ! C 0 and f 00 : C ! C 00 can be obtained by rst making the coproduct C 0 C 00 endowed with the injections i 0 : C 0 ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 : C 00 ! C 0 C 00 and then obtaining the coequalizer of i 0 f 0 and i 00 f 00 .
Hilbert calculi
We now introduce the notion of Hilbert calculus as an abstraction capturing the proof-theoretic aspects of a logic at the level of detail that we need: language constructors plus inference rules. It is convenient to distinguish among proof rules used for proving theorems and derivation rules for deriving consequences of a given set of hypotheses. This distinction is re ected at the model-theoretic level as we shall see in section 3.
De nition 2.8 A Hilbert calculus is a triple hC; P; Di where:
Each element r = hPrem(r); Conc(r)i; of P is a rule schema: Prem(r) is the ( nite) set of premises and Conc(r) is the conclusion. If Prem(r) = ; then r is said to be an axiom schema; otherwise r is said to be a proof rule schema. Each element of D is also said to be a derivation rule schema. Clearly, P and D are, respectively, the proof-theoretic counterparts of validity and entailment. Example 2.9 Propositional modal logic. A propositional (uni)modal Hilbert calculus over is a triple hC; P; Di such that:
C 0 = , C 1 = f:; g, C 2 = f)g; P fh;; ( 1 is a morphism in Sig such that f h = g. It is trivial to see that f is a morphism in Hil: f(h(r)) = g(r) for every r 2 P D, and hence provability or derivability in hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i are guaranteed, respectively, since g is a morphism. Of course, f is the only morphism in Hil such that N(f) = f and f h = g.
QED
We denote the codomain of the cocartesian morphism above by h(hC; P; Di).
Unconstrained bring
Intuitively, in the unconstrained bring of two Hilbert calculi we have the constructors and the inference rules from both calculi. To this end, the schema variables are essential to making the construction precise.
De nition 2.19 Let hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i and hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i be Hilbert calculi. Then, their unconstrained bring is hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i = hC 0 C 00 ; i 0 (P 0 ) i 00 (P 00 ); i 0 (D 0 ) i 00 (D 00 )i where i 0 ; i 00 are the injections of the coproduct C 0 C 00 .
For examples, we refer the reader to section 4. Proposition 2.20 Unconstrained brings are coproducts in Hil. Proof: 1. The injections i 0 and i 00 are morphisms in Hil. 2. Universal property. Let h 0 : hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i ! hC 000 ; P 000 ; D 000 i, h 00 : hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i ! hC 000 ; P 000 ; D 000 i be any morphisms in Hil. Let k : C 0 C 00 ! C 000 be the unique morphism in Sig such that k i 0 = f 0 and k i 00 = f 00 . Trivially, k is a morphism in Hil and it is the unique such that k i 0 = f 0 and k i 00 = f 00 .
QED
The coproduct construction captures the intuitive idea that bring should extend the given logics in a minimal and conservative way.
Constrained bring
In order to constrain the bring (imposing some interaction between the two given Hilbert systems) we may have two approaches that can be used together: sharing of constructors and addition of new rules.
The technique of cocartesian lifting provides the means for sharing constructors: it provides a canonical Hilbert system guided by the sharing de ned at the signature level.
De nition 2.21 Let hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i and hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i be Hilbert calculi and f 0 : C ! C 0 ; f 00 : C ! C 00 be injective signature morphisms. Then, their constrained bring by sharing is: hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i f 0 Cf 00 hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i = q(hC 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i hC 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i)
where q : C 0 C 00 ! C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 is the coequalizer of i 0 f 0 : C ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 f 00 : C ! C 0 C 00 .
For examples, we refer the reader to section 4. Note that we allow sharing of both atoms (propositional symbols) and logic operators (connectives and modalities). Sharing of logic operators is re ected not only in the syntax of the bred logic but it can also, in consequence, provide a way to impose some degree of interaction between the two logics. For instance, if we are bring two modal logics we may impose that the two boxes are identi ed, obtaining a box that inherits the properties of the two original ones.
Adding possibly mixed rules afterwards raises no technical challenge at the pure proof-theoretic level and we omit further discussion on the subject. See 18] for a study of such rules but in the context of a simpler mechanism for combining logics.
Fibring of interpretation systems
In this section we present a model-theoretic account of bring as a categorial construction. We start by introducing interpretation systems: intuitively, an interpretation system provides for a given signature of constructors a class of models and the means for interpreting the constructors in each model over a domain of points. Then, the evaluation of formulae can be carried out inductively on their structure using the interpretation given for the constructors.
After establishing the appropriate category of interpretation systems, we again show that unconstrained bring appears as a coproduct. And we again show that constrained bring (by sharing symbols) appears as a cocartesian lifting from the category of signatures.
Along the way, we compare our de nitions with the operational notion of bred semantics described in 8, 9].
Interpretation systems
We now introduce the notion of interpretation system as an abstraction capturing the model-theoretic aspects of a logic at the required level of detail: language constructors plus models with associated domains and interpretation maps for the constructors. To this end, it is convenient to start by de ning what we mean by a structure on a given signature:
De nition 3.1 Given a signature C, a C-structure is a pair hU; i where:
U is a nonempty set;
We denote by Str(C) the class of all C-structures. It is a simple task to close a pre-interpretation system with respect to model equivalence. The resulting interpretation system yields exactly the same entailment operators. A detailed proof will be given later on, still in this section.
Prop/De nition 3.4 Let hC; M; Ai be a pre-interpretation system. Then, we de ne its enrichment to be the interpretation system hC; M; Ai where:
M Note that many logics immediately yield interpretation systems (i.e., they are closed under equivalence of models). That is the case, for instance, of propositional modal logic (above). Linear propositional temporal logic, however, does not meet this requirement. Its models are usually seen as being maps from its set of propositional symbols to 2 IN which corresponds to IN structures. But clearly, any other denumerable set isomorphic to IN would do, as a carrier.
We can extract out of an interpretation system the alternative satisfaction relations (between models and formulae) and hence the corresponding entailment operators.
In the sequel, unless otherwise stated, we assume xed a (pre- the contextual satisfaction relation is as follows:
the oating satisfaction relation is as follows:
Clearly, the interpretation of formulae (without schema variables) does not depend on the particular assignment chosen. QED We now turn our attention to the problem of de ning an appropriate notion of interpretation system morphism. Clearly, such a morphism must relate the constructors and the models in a contravariant way. We also expected to have to map the points in the domains but, as it happened, it turns out that such a map is not needed since we are working with rich systems and therefore the change of points is not essential. Finally, the morphism must preserve the interpretation of the constructors in the obvious way.
De nition 3. Note that each model of the target system is associated with a collection of source models. The rst condition imposes that they induce a partition of the set of points of the target model. The second condition imposes a correspondence between the denotations of the constructors guided by the partition. Therefore, each target model can be seen as the \union" of a collection of source models. hm 00 u 00= f g m 00 u 00u 00 .
We prove that h is indeed an interpretation system morphism.
U h m 00 u 00 = fv 00 2 U m 00 : hm 00 v 00= hm 00 u 00g.
{ If v 00 2 U h m 00 u 00 then, by de nition of hm 00 u 00, v 00 2 U f g m 00 u 00 u 00 U g m 00 u 00 U m 00. Therefore, v 00 2 U m 00 and g m 00 v 00= g m 00 u 00. But then, also, f g m 00 v 00v 00 = f g m 00 u 00v 00 = f g m 00 u 00u 00 and so hm 00 v 00= hm 00 u 00. 
Unconstrained bring
We need to use the following (well known) results on xed points originally due to Tarski and Kleene 14].
Proposition 3.14 Let hU; i be a complete lattice, u 2 U and f : U ! U a monotonic map such that u f(u). Then, the set fv 2 U : u v = f(v)g has a minimum. Moreover, if f is continuous then, letting f 0 (u) = u; f n+1 (u) = f(f n (u)), the minimum element is W n2IN f n (u). Clearly, the minimum element above is the least xed point of f which is greater or equal than u. In the sequel, we denote it by lfp(f; u).
We are now ready to propose the envisaged de nition of unconstrained bring of two given interpretation systems. As before we obtain bring as a coproduct. Re ected on the proposed notion of morphism of interpretation systems, and therefore captured by coproducts, is the concept of bring function 9]: the bring function for each bred model is given, implicitly, by the injection morphisms.
Note that the logic resulting from the bring still has the structure of an interpretation system contrarily to the \operational" description of bred semantics given elsewhere.
Prop/De nition 3.15 Let hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 i and hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 i be interpretation systems. Then, their unconstrained bring hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 i hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 i, is the interpretation system hC 0 C 00 ; M; Ai de ned as follows using the injections i 0 : C 0 ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 : C 00 ! C 0 C 00 in Sig: M v 000 2V (U f 0 m 000 v 000 U f 00 m 000 v 000 ) = E m 000(V ). Since v 000 2 U, i.e., v 000 2 E n m 000 (fu 000 g) for some n 2 IN, it is enough to prove, by induction on n, that also u 000 2 E n m 000 (fv 000 g). Base: v 000 2 E 0 m 000 (fu 000 g) = fu 000 g i v 000 = u 000 .
Step: v 000 2 E n+1 m 000 (fu 000 g) = E m 000(E n m 000 (fu 000 g)) i v 000 2 E m 000(fw 000 g) for some w 000 2 E n m 000 (fu 000 g). Clearly, v 000 2 E m 000(fw 000 g) = (U f 0 m 000 w 000 U f 00 m 000 w 000 ) implies that also w 000 2 E m 000(fv 000 g) = (U f 0 m 000 v 000 U f 00 m 000 v 000 ). So, by induction hypothesis, u 000 2 E n m 000 (fw 000 g) E n m 000 (E m 000(fv 000 g)) = E n+1 m 000 (fv 000 g). ii. g is a morphism in Int.
U g m 000 u 000 = fv 000 2 U m 000 : g m 000 v 000= g m 000 u 000g. If g m 000 v 000= g m 000 u 000, it is trivial that v 000 2 lfp(E m 000; fv 000 g) = U g m 000 v 000 = U g m 000 u 000 . On the other hand, if v 000 2 U g m 000 u 000 then obviously v 000 2 E n m 000 (fu 000 g) for some n 2 IN. As before, also, u 000 2 E n m 000 (fv 000 g) and thus, lfp(E m 000; fv 000 g) = lfp(E m 000; fu 000 g). Clearly, then, g m 000 v 000= g m 000 u 000. iii. g i 0 = f 0 and g i 00 = f 00 .
By de nition, Moreover, it is immediate that i 0 g m 000 u 000u 000 = 0 u 000 = f 0 m 000 u 000 and i 00 g m 000 u 000u 000 = 00 u 000 = f 00 m 000 u 000.
iv. Uniqueness. We prove that g m 000 u 000 could not be other than lfp(E m 000; fu 000 g). Necessarily, g m 000 u 000= hU; i with u 000 2 U U m 000 and determined as above by the composition requirement. Also, O(U) = E m 000(U) U, which implies that lfp(E m 000; fu 000 g) U. But it is required that U = lfp(O; fu 000 g), so U = lfp(E m 000; fu 000 g). QED The coproduct construction faithfully captures the intuitive idea of bred semantics as described for instance in 9].
We delay the illustration of bring of interpretation systems to the next section.
Constrained bring
Again, interesting applications will be constrained: in general, we are interested in sharing constructors. As before, the technique of cocartesian lifting provides the means for constructing the envisaged system guided by the sharing at the signature level.
De nition 3.18 Let hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 i and hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 i be interpretation systems and f 0 : C ! C 0 ; f 00 : C ! C 00 be injective signature morphisms. Then, their constrained bring by sharing is as follows: hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 i f 0 Cf 00 hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 i = q(hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 i hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 i)
where q : C 0 C 00 ! C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 is the coequalizer in Sig of i 0 f 0 : C ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 f 00 : C ! C 0 C 00 .
Recall that the coequalizer in Sig is a family of surjective maps as required by the lifting. For examples, we refer the reader to section 4.
Since sharing of non nullary constructors is also possible, we have here a generalization to all constructors of the idea of dovetailing proposed by Gabbay: shared atoms have the same interpretation, i.e., they become indistinguishable.
Further constraining may be achieved by restricting the class of models in the bred logic. Of course, then it can be rather di cult or impossible to nd a proof-theoretic counterpart of such a restriction. 4 Fibring of logic system presentations We now put together Hilbert calculi and interpretation systems to form logic system presentations. This is straightforward as expected. At the end of this section we present several examples and illustrate the bring construction. The mechanism of cocartesian lifting is again used for constructing a new logic system presentation from a given one along a given signature morphism. We denote the codomain of the cocartesian morphism de ned above by h(hC; M; A; P; Di).
Logic system presentations

Fibring
Fibring of logic system presentations results from the combined e ect of bring their Hilbert calculi and interpretation systems.
Prop/De nition 4.6 Let p 0 and p 00 be, respectively, logic system presentations hC 0 ; M 0 ; A 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 i and hC 00 ; M 00 ; A 00 ; P 00 ; D 00 i. Then, their unconstrained bring p = p 0 p 00 , is the logic system presentation hC; M; A; P; Di such that: where q : C 0 C 00 ! C 0 f 0 Cf 00 C 00 is the coequalizer in Sig of i 0 f 0 : C ! C 0 C 00 and i 00 f 00 : C ! C 0 C 00 . where u is the unique element of U; P = fh;; ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 1 ))i; h;; ( ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 3 )) ) ( ( 1 ) 2 ) ) ( 1 ) 3 )))i; h;; (((: 1 ) ) (: 2 )) ) ( 2 ) 1 ))i; hf 1 ; ( 1 ) 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 1 ))i; h;; ( ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 3 )) ) ( ( 1 ) 2 ) ) ( 1 ) We now illustrate the proposed constructions by bring two modal logics. While rich enough to bring in to play all the details of the constructions, it is still a su ciently simple case that can be easily understood. In this case, we get a bimodal logic, where the two (independent) modalities i 0 ( ) = 0 and i 00 ( ) = 00 have the properties inherited from above.
Examples
The Kripke structure associated to it is hW; S 0 ; S 00 ; V i where: W = W 0 = W 00 = U; V = :V 0 (i 0 ( )) = :V 00 (i 00 ( )).
We can prove, for instance (( 00 ( 0 ( 00 ))) ) ( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 ))))).
1: (( 0 ( 00 )) ) ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 )))) 4 0 2: ( 00 (( 0 ( 00 )) ) ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 )))))
Nec 00 : 1 3: (( 00 (( 0 ( 00 )) ) ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 )))))) (( 00 ( 0 ( 00 ))) ) ( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 )))))) K 00 4: (( 00 ( 0 ( 00 ))) ) ( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 ))))) MP: 2,3 5: (( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 )))) ) ( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 ))))) D 00 6: (( 00 ( 0 ( 00 ))) ) ( 00 ( 0 ( 0 ( 00 ))))) Syllogism: 4, 5
Furthermore, if we also share the boxes, we get a unimodal logic S5.
The induced Kripke structure is now hW; S; V i where: S = S 0 = S 00 .
In fact S is an equivalence relation on U. Re exivity follows from transitivity and symmetry of S 0 , and seriality of S 00 .
It is a well known result in modal logic that we can, in fact, prove T: We now consider the problem raised by trying to combine intuitionistic logic with classical logic. It is well known 9, 7] that by just putting together the rules from both calculi the intuitionistic component collapses into classical logic. The following example presents the propositional intuitionistic logic system presentation and shows what happens when we bre it with the classical propositional logic system presentation.
Example 4.12 The case of intuitionistic logic. Let be a set of propositional symbols. The propositional intuitionistic logic system presentation p IL = hC; M; A; P; Di over is outlined below. The signature is as follows:
C 0 = , C 1 = fvg, C 2 = f!;^; _g.
The proof rules of the Hilbert calculus can be taken for instance from 4].
The only derivation rule is modus ponens. Note that P includes the axiom schema:
It is worthwhile to ponder on the meaning of this axiom schema. It states that for every instance of 1 and 2 we obtain a theorem.
The envisaged interpretation system is similar to a modal logic one with the proviso that truth is persistent under accessibility. Therefore we would expect the following semantics: However, this is not quite so! Indeed, the axiom schema mentioned above is not sound for every model in M. In order to make it sound, we have to restrict M to the class of models hW; S; V i where S is the identity relation over W. Therefore, we are reduced to working with \classical" models where the intuitionistic negation and implication of course become classical. Naturally, if we combine by bring this logic presentation system with the classical logic presentation system we obtain classical logic.
In alternative, if we insist in faithfully representing intuitionistic semantics, we must constrain the set of admissible assignments (accepting only persistent assignments of 1 ). But this would require a di erent notion of interpretation system where the structure of each model would be a triple hU; V; i with V 2 U and k (c) : V k ! V. Each assignment would be of the form : ! V as required. It is outside the scope of this paper to investigate such a generalized notion of interpretation system. In the case at hand of intuitionistic logic, V should be the set of all persistent maps b 2 2 W such that if w 2 b then w 0 2 b for every w 0 such that hw; w 0 i 2 S.
The example above shows that our notion of interpretation system is not general enough to represent intuitionistic logic: we only have classical models. The fact that after bring we get classical logic is therefore due to this limitation and not to any inadequacy of the proposed notion of bring.
In section 6 we outline future work aimed at overcoming this limitation along the lines of the proposed generalization.
Preservation properties
In this section, after establishing some preliminary results on how derivation and entailment are transferred, we prove that soundness is preserved by both forms of bring (unconstrained and constrained).
We assume xed a logic system presentation p = hC; M; A; P; Di. We denote its schema language by L p = L(C; ) and its language by L p = L(C; ; 
Derivation
All the results of this subsection are concerned with the proof-theoretic part of a logic system presentation. They could, of course, have been stated and proved with respect to Hilbert calculi, instead.
As we have seen before, morphisms preserve derivations as well as schema derivations. Hence, for logic system presentations we have: 
Entailment
All the de nitions and results of this subsection are concerned with the modeltheoretic part of a logic system presentation. They could, of course, have been stated and proved with respect to interpretation systems, instead.
We look rst at how morphisms treat satisfaction:
Proposition 5. 
Soundness
We are now ready to tackle the problem of verifying if soundness is preserved by bring. Actually, we prove that if the inference rules are sound in the given logic system presentations, then the inference rules are still sound in the unconstrained and constrained bred logics. Step:
is Conc(r) for some r 2 P. 
QED
Note that, in fact, the soundness of the rules of p is strictly stronger than the soundness of p itself. In fact, soundness of p implies the soundness of all its derivation rules. However, as far as proof rules are concerned, the only guarantee is that every application of a rule in a proof from ; is \sound".
In general, for soundness preservation purposes, it is necessary that proof rules are indeed sound. This is not a severe restriction since in most (all?) known cases, the soundness of a proof system results from the soundness of its rules. In any case, any unsound rule in a sound logic system presentation can be safely replaced by all its useful instances (which are sound!).
Moreover, preservation of soundness through bring must be related with the corresponding inclusion or cocartesian morphisms. And, by de nition, morphisms preserve rules rather than just provability and derivability, which is essential to the notion of bring as explained in the motivation. Proof: 1. Proof rules.
By de nition, the proof rules of p 000 are P 000 = q(P), where P are the proof rules of p. Let r 000 = q(r) 2 P 000 . From the previous result, r 2 P is sound, Conc(r) 2 Prem(r) p , and thus q(Conc(r)) 2 q(Prem(r) p ) q(Prem(r)) p 000 . So, Conc(r 000 ) 2 Prem(r 000 ) p 000 and r 000 is sound. 2. Derivation rules.
By de nition, the derivation rules of p 000 are D 000 = q(D), where D are the derivation rules of p. Let r 000 = q(r) 2 D 000 . From the previous result, r 2 D is sound, Conc(r) 2 Prem(r) p , and thus q(Conc(r)) 2 q(Prem(r) p ) q(Prem(r)) p 000 . So, Conc(r 000 ) 2 Prem(r 000 ) p 000 and r 000 is sound.
QED 6 Concluding remarks
We made a categorial characterization of bring at both proof-theoretic and model-theoretic levels, providing a novel bred semantics with explicit models. At the proof-theoretic level, after establishing the appropriate category of Hilbert calculi, we showed that unconstrained bring appears as a coproduct. And we showed that constrained bring (by sharing both propositional symbols and logical operators) appears as a cocartesian lifting from the category of signatures.
At the model-theoretic level, we were able to repeat the process for interpretation systems, providing a semantics of bring with explicit models. Fibring at the semantic level turned out to be much more di cult to characterize but again we obtained it as a coproduct (in the unconstrained case) and as a cocartesian lifting (in the constrained case).
By putting together inference rules and models in the notion of logic system presentation, we were able to characterize bring with proofs and semantics hand in hand. At this point, we illustrated the proposed constructions and gave a simple but su ciently meaningful example of bring within modal logic. We also discussed in detail the problem of bring intuitionistic and classical logics showing a limitation of the proposed notion of interpretation system. Finally, after some preliminary results showing how derivation and entailment are transferred from the given logics into the resulting logic, we showed that soundness is preserved by bring.
We should stress again the main limitations of the paper. We concentrated herein only on propositional-based logics, i.e., logics without terms and variable binding operators like quanti cation. The proposed approach seems to be workable in the more general case, but we feel that the reduced complexity and the usefulness of propositional-based logics well justify presenting only the results on the simpler case. For preliminary results on the topic of bring of more complex logics see 19] . Therein, rules are considered to be composed of requirements, premises and conclusion. Requirements are used to express constraints such as \term free for variable in formula". They may also be used for \weakening" the axiom ( 1 ! ( 2 ! 1 )) of intuitionistic logic by imposing that 1 may only be replaced by a persistent formula (as proposed by 7] when bring intuitionistic and classical logic). The other limitation concerns the fact that we cannot faithfully represent the semantics of intuitionistic logic. But the proposed approach seems to be workable in the more general case of interpretation systems capable of representing general frames as sketched at the end of section 4. Such general frames will encompass intuitionistic logics and are also interesting from the point of view of completeness preservation by bring.
Indeed, another important line of work is concerned with additional preservation results, for instance on model existence and completeness. It seems that the techniques used in 13] can be adapted.
The connection of our approach to the approach presented in 12] also seems to be a worthwhile line of future research, now that we have some results for logics with variables, terms and binding operators 19] .
We would like to end with a few words on applications. We expect that the work on bring will have great impact in some application areas such as software engineering and arti cial intelligence. Indeed, in both areas it is necessary in many situations to work with several formalisms (read logics) for specifying and reasoning about systems, since some aspects of those systems are better described in one formalism and other aspects in a quite di erent formalism 2, 16]. For instance, in software engineering, dynamic logic and temporal logic are frequently used in the same project. Fibring can help a lot in such cases, since it provides a rich environment where both kinds of reasoning can be made. Furthermore, bring seems to be a more general combination than those that have been considered in practice so far.
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